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I. INTRODUCTION
On December 1, 2005, the Constitutional Court of South Africa set that
nation on course to join a small and, perhaps, surprising list of countries.
Following Belgium,1 the Netherlands,2 Canada,3 Spain,4 and the American state
of Massachusetts,5 South Africa looked set to become the fifth country and
sixth jurisdiction to grant full marriage recognition to same-sex couples., Its
entry is surprising, perhaps, because it is the first jurisdiction outside of the
northern hemisphere and the so-called "West" to move toward such full
recognition. Furthermore, South Africa-while certainly much more tolerant of
same-sex relationships than its African neighbors-in many regions remains
more hostile to homosexuality than Amsterdam, Madrid, Boston, or
Vancouver.
7
Thanks to its recent history, however, South Africa can also be seen as
more actively hostile to discrimination, including that based on sexual
orientation, than many "Western" jurisdictions. In the upper reaches of South
Africa's judiciary, this hostility has fostered a deep concern with
1. Loi ouvrant le mariage A des personnes de m~me sexe et modifiant certaines dispositions du
Code civil (Feb. 13, 2003) (Belg.), Moniteur Belge, Feb. 28, 2003, at 9880-82; see also Belgium Votes
To Recognize Gay Marriages, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 31, 2003, at 6.
2. Wet wan 21 December 2000 tot wijziging van Boek 1 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek in verband
met de openstelling van het huwelijk voor personen van hetzelfde geslacht (Wet openstelling huwelijk),
Stb. 2001, nr. 9 (Neth.), translated in Text of Dutch Act on the Opening Up of Marriage for Same-Sex
Partners (Kees Waaldijk trans.), in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS 455, 455-56
(Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenaes eds., 2001).
3. Civil Marriage Act, 2005 S.C., ch. 33, s. 2 (Can.); Halpern v. Toronto City, [2003] 65 O.R. 3d
161, 108, 154 (Ont. C.A.).
4. On June 30, 2005, Spain legalized same-sex marriage by adding one sentence to its pre-existing
marriage law: "Marriage will have the same requirements and results when the two people entering into
the contract are of the same sex or of different sexes." Renwick McLean, Spain Legalizes Gay
Marriage; Law is Among Most Liberal, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2005, at Al.
5. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
6. Minister of Home Affairs & Others v Fourie & Another 2006 (3) BCLR 355 (CC) (S. Afr.), 2005
SACLR LEXIS 34, archived at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/. The Constitutional Court hearing
and opinion consolidated two separate cases. The first, brought by Mari6 Adriaana Fourie and her
partner Cecelia Johanna Bonthuys, challenged only the common-law definition of marriage and worked
its way up to the Constitutional Court through the typical appellate procedure. See id. 6-12, 18-19,
21-22, 33. Because Fourie and Bonthuys failed to challenge the statutory provision that executed the
common-law marriage definition, the Lesbian and Gay Equality Project (LGEP) successfully sought
leave to appeal directly to the Constitutional Court for the purposes of raising the statutory concern. See
id. 34. This consolidation enabled the Court to decide the entirety of the same-sex marriage issue
without being forced by the limited pleadings in the Fourie matter to thread a fine and twisted needle on
questions of remedy. The LGEP is not currently active, and its future is uncertain at the moment. In the
interest of continuing to honor their role in the historic judgment, I refer to the case in the text and,
where appropriate, in subsequent citations using the slightly unconventional shorthand form of
Fourie/LGEP.
7. This comparison is more than a bit unfair, for South Africa itself features thriving and visible
LGBT communities in urban centers such as Johannesburg and Cape Town, and increasingly strong
LGBT communities around the country. Moreover, the entire continent boasts a rich and varied history
of same-sex sexual practices and identities. These communities and this history both contribute to and
draw strength from the legal change which looks so surprising to many non-South African eyes. To be
surprised by South Africa's LGBT progress is, among other things, to ignore these elements of African
society.
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discrimination's more slippery, symbolic dimensions. The Fourie/LGEP
opinion mandating same-sex marriage represented a new threshold for the
country's Constitutional Court, mobilizing a strikingly expansive conception of
law's symbolic influence. The opinion portrayed law as an important symbolic
influence on society and suggested that this influence is mediated by the cross-
cutting influences it finds there. More pointedly, the Fourie/LGEP opinion also
signaled the Court's intention to hold law tightly accountable for any harmful
effects that emerge from this interplay of legal and social symbols.8 This
concern with deleterious downstream symbolic effects did not extend to any
that may be wrought by the very existence of marriage itself, however. Indeed,
the Court sidestepped a major objection articulated by many LGBT people: that
marriage remains the ubiquitous symbolic goal by which all other relationships
are judged inferior-if, indeed, they are seen as relationships at all. 9 In its
strongest form, this objection argues that as long as marriage exists, it will paint
all other relationships as also-rans. In this strong, abolitionist view, the end of
such discrimination requires the end of marriage.
This objection shares with the Fourie/LGEP Court an expansive symbolic
vision of the law-society nexus. But the Fourie/LGEP Court not only declined
to abolish marriage; it explicitly forbade such a step. 10 In so doing, the Court
emphasized marriage's congenial symbolic dimensions as a normative good to
which access must be encouraged. Any limitations to marriage were
constructed and curable, not intrinsic and intractable. The Fourie/LGEP view,
in short, was unabashedly pro-marriage. Furthermore, it came on the heels of
yet another controversial decision in which the same Court had declined to
extend domestic partnership benefits to the survivor of an unmarried opposite-
sex couple. 1 I In my view, these cases taken together sketch the first outlines of
what I call the consolidationist approach of the current South African
Constitutional Court toward questions of relationship recognition. The
consolidationist approach attempts to resolve many people's exclusion from the
current form of relationship recognition (i.e., marriage) by pulling that one
form's boundaries outward to encompass more relationships.
The judiciary's consolidationist project has unfolded alongside a more
proliferationist alternative centered in the elected branches of South Africa's
government. Parliament has enacted legislation providing for the recognition of
customary marriages performed under "traditional" indigenous law, 12 while
8. See infra Section II.A.
9. This objection is not limited to gay, lesbian, or queer people. For example, the call of Martha
Fineman for care-based rather than sex-based relationship recognition is broadly similar. See MARTHA
FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY
TRAGEDIES (1995).
10. Fourie/LGEP 149.
11. Volks NO v Robinson & Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC) (S. Afr.), 2005 SACLR LEXIS 3,
archived at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/.
12. Recognition of Customary Marriages Act (RCMA) 120 of 1998, available at
http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/1998/al 20-98.pdf.
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proposals remain in development that would extend similar recognition to
Islamic marriages. 13 At both symbolic and material levels, these proliferating
forms expand the alternatives available to South Africans for the recognition of
their conjugal relationships and attempt to rectify the perceived inadequacy of
existing marriage forms for protecting and recognizing those diverse
relationship practices. Government's 14 proposed response 5 to the Fourie/LGEP
ruling would have pushed this proliferationist project further in two respects.
Most straightforwardly, alongside its proposals for same-sex marriage, the
original Civil Union Bill included the creation of two domestic partnership
statuses for the regulation of both opposite- and same-sex conjugal
relationships-a proposal that was unfortunately dropped from the final
legislation. 16 Not only would these new statuses have entailed fewer legal
entanglements than those attending marriage, but they also would have enabled
South Africans to seek legal recognition for their relationships outside the
symbolic confines of marriage itself.
The original bill presented a similar choice to would-be same-sex spouses.
Couples who wished to marry under this bill would have been allowed at the
moment of consecration to choose whether to call their union a "civil
partnership" or a "marriage." 17 The original bill did not represent a uniformly
happy world of relationship autonomy, however. Not only did this bill limit
civil partnerships to same-sex couples, but it also seemed to suggest that
government would usually call a same-sex union a "civil partnership," no
matter what the union's members chose to call it themselves. 1 The choice of
13. See SA Law Commission Discussion Paper 101 Islamic Marriages and Related Matters
(January 2002), available at http://www.doj.gov.za/salrc/dpapers/dpl0lpj59/dpl01 prj59-2002.pdf.
Many South African legal and political actors are also contemplating the creation of a Hindu marriage
act. See, e.g., Fourie/LGEP 108, 146. No formal research or proposal process has yet begun for
Hindu marriages. It should be noted that both Islamic and Hindu South Africans are currently free to
marry under section 3(l) of the existing Marriage Act 25 of 1961.
14. 1 use "government" throughout this Comment as a synonym for the executive branch, as is
conventional in parliamentary systems. I use "the government" to refer to the South African government
as a whole, including Parliament and the judicial system.
15. Civil Union Bill, 2006, B 26-2006 (GG) (submitted to the National Assembly on August 31,
2006) [hereinafter Civil Union Bill (original)], available at http://www.pmg.org.zafbills/090613b26-
06.pdf. This bill was passed by one House of Parliament in significantly amended form as this Comment
went to press, and looked likely to win adoption in that form. See Civil Union Bill, 2006, B 26B-2006
(adopted by the National Assembly on November 14, 2006) [hereinafter Civil Union Bill (amended)],
available at http://www.pmg.org.za/bills/061109B26b-06.pdf. The discussion contained in this
Comment is largely based on the original version of the bill. I highlight the most important changes in
the amended version infra notes 16-18 and elsewhere, as they arise.
16. Civil Union Bill (original), supra note 15, ch. 3. As mentioned, these have been removed from
the final version of the bill. See Civil Union Bill (amended), supra note 15.
17. Civil Union Bill (original), supra note 15, s. 11. See also Civil Union Bill (original) s. 4
(limiting that bill's scope to same-sex couples). The amended bill extends the option discussed here to
opposite-sex as well as to same-sex couples. Civil Union Bill (amended), supra note 15, s. 4, 11.
18. The final version of the bill strengthens its status as a "marriage" bill, per se, by placing
marriage alongside civil partnership as co-equal statuses within the broader category of "civil unions."
Civil Union Bill (amended), supra note 15, s. 1. With access to the civil union category as a whole now
gender-neutral, as discussed supra note 17, the new bill sends a clear signal that the same-sex couples
married under this bill are just as married as are the opposite-sex couples.
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the foregoing proliferationist project had been retained and extended but with
only half the recognition. And so South Africa's government proposed what
would probably have been the world's first instance of civil
partnership/marriage, a cumbersome and confusing status that practically
invited the somewhat tongue-in-cheek name I will use for it in this Comment-
the slash marriage.' 9 Yet this clumsily discriminatory proposal, for all its flaws,
may have contained within it an alternative to the all-or-nothing tug-of-war
between consolidationist marriage celebration and abolitionist marriage
critique, an alternative the final bill looks to put directly to the test. Why
shouldn't every spouse-straight, gay, or otherwise-be allowed to choose
what the government calls her union, whilst retaining the full tangible
protection of the law?
In this Comment, I will suggest that all other things being equal (and I do
mean equal), the proliferation of marriage types-and of relationship
recognition forms more generally-may represent a more workable solution
than abolition for loosening marriage's normative stranglehold over the
relationship order. If marriage were simply abolished, then another word might
rise to take its place, continuing to render the un-whatevered among us inferior
and invisible. Alternatively, the law's abandonment of marriage could throw
marriage's normative power fully back into the hands of private institutions
that are not always progressive-notably, but not exclusively, religious
institutions. Perhaps marriage proliferation could represent a way to maintain
law's right to oversee relationship inclusion and exclusion, without
concentrating that oversight in the hands of a monolithically powerful symbol.
In time, perhaps it could even cultivate the habits of mind necessary to imagine
the proliferation breakthrough we most truly need in the realm of relationship
recognition: the expansion of relationship protection beyond the conjugal
couple.
20
This Comment begins in Part II by outlining the Constitutional Court's
consolidationist approach toward marriage, and how that approach limits the
Court's otherwise expansive conception of symbolic construction in the law-
society nexus. Part III highlights both the commonalities and disagreements of
the Court's consolidationist approach with the more abolitionist view
advocated by LGBT critics of marriage such as Michael Warner. Part IV then
turns to the proliferationist approach of South Africa's elected branches,
situating the Civil Union Bill in the context of other recent legislative
developments regarding marriage and relationship recognition more broadly.
19. For the reasons discussed supra notes 17-18, this may not be a good descriptor of the final bill.
Obviously these various proposals force us to ask just what defines a marriage. It is a new take on an
age-old ambiguity: Now we must puzzle over the "marriage-ness" not of the relationship but of the
recognition. I save that interesting knot of questions for another paper.
20. For a recent example of this position, see Beyond Same-Sex Marriage: A New Strategic Vision
for All Our Families & Relationships (July 26, 2006), http://www.beyondmarriage.org/
BeyondMarriage.pdf.
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Part V concludes that South Africa's proliferationist tendencies may
unintentionally suggest new possibilities for mitigating and fracturing
marriage's normative power.
II. THE CONSOLIDATIONIST MARRIAGE PROJECT OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
Fourie/LGEP was a watershed moment in the global struggle for LGBT
rights. At a moment when so few countries around the world grant full
recognition to same-sex partnerships, one cannot help but admire South
Africa's breathtakingly rapid progress on LGBT legal issues. Just to the north,
Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe has perfected the art of ham-handed
anti-gay scapegoating, 21 while the government of former South African
22possession Namibia also occasionally antagonizes its own LGBT population.
Despite this apparent contrast, South Africa shares with its African
neighbors particular histories of family arrangements that have influenced the
shape of the same-sex marriage debate thus far. In particular, many Africans,
both inside and outside South Africa, view marriage primarily as an alliance of
extended families rather than as a union of individuals. 23 Many of these same
people rightly believe that colonial- and apartheid-era family law did little to
accommodate such beliefs. To cure this defect, South Africa now permits its
traditionally-minded citizens to register their marriages under distinct laws
2 4
that approach marriage as a moment not only for consummating relationships
but also for affirming cultural commitments. 25 The relationship of the South
African same-sex marriage debate to this broader, self-consciously
multicultural South African context is complex. Amid the complexity,
however, I believe three underlying assumptions can be discerned in the
Fourie/LGEP opinion that draw on this history: 1) Marriage is a fundamental
institution for the expression of societal values; 2) marriage is capable, properly
21. Mugabe famously banned the organization Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe from a book fair,
whereupon he commenced an intermittent campaign of anti-gay invective. See, e.g., S. Afr. Press
Assoc., Mugabe Urges People to Arrest Homosexuals, Aug. 14, 1995 (LEXIS, News & Business
Library, Combined Sources); Lewis Machipisa, Zimbabwe-Human Rights: President Lashes Out at
Gays, Aug. 18, 1995 (LEXIS, News & Business Library, Combined Sources). Comments such as these
and the LGBT Zimbabweans who resist them are chronicled in Kai Wright, Under African Skies: A
Four-Part Series on Gay Zimbabwe (pts. 1-4), WASH. BLADE, Apr. 28-May 19, 2000, available at
http://www.kaiwright.com/gayzimbabwe.php.
22. See, e.g., Namibia Gay Rights Row, BBC NEWS (Oct. 2, 2000), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
africa/953657.stm.
23. See generally Eileen Jensen Krige, A Comparative Analysis of Marriage and Social Structure
Among the Southern Bantu, in AFRICAN MARRIAGE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA I (Eileen Jensen Krige &
John L. Comaroffeds., 1981).
24. See Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998.
25. See Michael W. Yarbrough, We Thee Wed: Customary Marriage Law and the Meanings of
Culture in Post-Apartheid South Africa (Sept. 28, 2005) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
[Vol. 18:2
South Africa's Wedding Jitters
arranged, of expressing a wide variety of such values; and 3) sometimes those
values are expressed through marriage's exclusions as much as its inclusions.
26
Substantively, these assumptions differ little from those that drive same-
sex marriage debates in Europe and North America. But South Africa's
Constitutional Court was notable, in my opinion, for how seriously it took
them. Fourie/LGEP employed a strikingly expansive conception of legally
cognizable symbolic harms, highlighting a number of marriage's symbolic
trappings that fall far outside the four comers of the law, and arguing that the
law helps to construct these symbols' significance. It set a high bar for the
parliamentary response, demanding symbolic parity not only in the law's
language but also in the context and application it would help to bring about.
As this Part will argue, this bar would be easiest to clear with a unified,
consolidationist marriage solution.
A. The Harm of Symbolic Exclusion
As presented to the Constitutional Court, the Fourie/LGEP litigation was
noteworthy for the complete lack of dispute between the plaintiffs and
government over the material entitlements of same-sex couples. Through both
litigation and legislation, same-sex partners had already won a number of
material benefits, including immigration protections, 27 public employment
pensions, joint adoption rights, and automatic parental rights for the same-
sex partner of a mother who conceived through artificial insemination.30 In
dicta, the Court had expressed frustration with this "piecemeal" approach to
lesbian and gay rights, calling for "[c]omprehensive legislation regularising
relationships between gay and lesbian persons." 3 1 But government argued that
the extension of these rights had rendered same-sex marriage itself unnecessary
because "the position of gay and lesbian couples has significantly improved
over the years .... [T]hey can no longer be regarded as suffering from patterns
26. Where same-sex marriage advocates and some traditional Africanists might differ, of course, is
on the question of which such exclusions are normatively desirable and which are not.
27. Nat'l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. & Others v Minister of Home Affairs & Others 1999 (2)
SA I (CC) (S. Aft.), archived at htp://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/.
28. Satchwell v President of the Republic of S. Afr. 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC) (S. Aft.), archived at
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/.
29. Du Toit & Another v Minister of Welfare & Population Dev & Others 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC) (S.
Aft.), archived at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/.
30. J & Another v Dir. Gen.: Dept. of Home Affairs & Others 2003 (5) SA 621 (CC) (S. Aft.),
archived at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/. Rights have also been extended to same-sex couples
through various statutes. See, e.g., Independent Media Commission Act 148 of 1993; Independent
Broadcasting Authority Act 153 of 1993; Pensions Act 69 of 1996; Lotteries Act 57 of 1997; Basic
Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997; Housing Act 107 of 1997; Special Medical Schemes Act
131 of 1998; South African Civil Aviation Authority Act 40 of 1998; Employment Equity Act 55 of
1998; Road Traffic Management Corporation Act 20 of 1999.
31. J&Another 23.
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of systematic disadvantage. ' 32 As disingenuous or naYve as this characterization
may be, it limited the dispute to issues of status.
33
With the material questions off the table, the Court was free to focus its
inquiry on the symbolic effects of marriage discrimination-in its eyes, no
trivial undertaking. Writing for the Court, Justice Albie Sachs emphasized that
"[i]t should be noted that the intangible damage to same-sex couples is as
severe as the material deprivation." 34 A mantra of equal "status, entitlements,
[and] responsibilities" echoed throughout the opinion.35 Justice Sachs
approvingly referenced the opinion below in the Supreme Court of Appeals,
36
where openly gay Justice Edwin Cameron had argued that:
the exclusionary definition of marriage injures gays and lesbians
because it implies a judgment on them. It suggests not only that their
relationships and commitments and loving bonds are inferior, but that
they themselves can never be fully part of the community of moral
equals that the Constitution promises to create for all.37
In this formulation, marriage discrimination was seen as problematic both for
the message it sent and for the ways that message hindered full and equal
public participation by lesbian and gay people. A familiar, if infrequently
accepted, argument in the worldwide same-sex marriage debate, it starts from
the assumed premise that the moral community pins all its relationship
recognition on marriage, and that to be excluded from the institution, whatever
other inclusions one may enjoy, is thus fundamentally harmful.
The Constitutional Court went even further than Cameron had gone in his
own opinion, attempting to understand the ways that law's messages intersect
with the symbolic hierarchies and practices circulating through social action
more broadly. In particular, Justice Sachs focused on a brief catalog of societal
marital rituals:
To begin with, [gays and lesbians] are not entitled to celebrate their
commitment to each other in a joyous public event recognised by the
law. They are obliged to live in a state of legal blankness in which
their unions remain unmarked by the showering of presents and the
commemoration of anniversaries so celebrated in our culture.
38
He made this broad statement although same-sex relationships did already
occasion some private celebration and gifts at the time. After all, celebrations,
gifts, and commemorations are each primarily social, rather than legal
32. Applicants' Heads of Argument at 41, Minister of Home Affairs & Another v Fourie &
Another, Mar. 16, 2005, archived at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/.
33. Id. at 43-47.
34. Minister of Home Affairs & Another v Fourie & Another 2006 (3) BCLR 355 (CC) 72 (S.
Aft.).
35. See, e.g., id. 72, 75, 78, 81, 98, 105, 147, 149.
36. See id. 17.
37. Fourie & Another v Minister of Home Affairs & Others 2005 (3) BCLR 241 (SCA) 15 (S.
Afr.), 2004 SACLR LEXIS 36. Notice that this formulation references the impact of marriage access not
only on gays and lesbians who actually marry but also on the LGBT community in general.
38. Fourie/LGEP 72.
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practices. So why did Justice Sachs emphasize them? One answer might be that
in the context of opposite-sex marriage, these social events double as legal
events-they are, as Justice Sachs wrote, "recognised by the law."39 This
statement is certainly true of the "joyous public event ' 40 of the wedding
ceremony. But what of "the showering of presents and the commemoration of
anniversaries"? 4 Gifts, as it happens, can play an important evidentiary role in
proving the existence of a recognized marriage under the distinct and parallel
South African legal framework of customary, or "traditional," African law.
42
But customary marriage was not on the table in Fourie/LGEP, and gifting
certainly plays no analogous legal function in the recognition of civil
marriages.
Thus, Justice Sachs's point here could not be only that these symbolic
practices are not legally recognized. I would suggest that a more plausible
reading is that they are not legally constituted. They occur far less frequently
and carry far less symbolic weight for same-sex couples than they do for
opposite-sex couples, and they do so because the law is not hovering in the
background, smiling and nudging them along like the mother of the bride.
These performances have a hollowness to them-a "legal blankness"-which
the Court unanimously declared a constitutionally impermissible harm.
With this holding, the Court commanded government to be mindful of the
far-reaching influence of societal symbolic structures and to set policy
accordingly. In hopes that the legitimacy of same-sex marriage might be
strengthened by a legislative imprimatur, the Court suspended its order for one
year,4 3 giving Parliament a "free hand" to decide how best to respond.44 This
free hand was something of a sleight-of-hand, however, as Justice Sachs strung




42. "'[L]obolo' means the property, in cash or in kind... which a prospective husband or the head
of his family undertakes to give to the head of the prospective wife's family in consideration of a
customary marriage." Recognition of Customary Marriages Act (RCMA) 120 of 1998 s. I. The analogy
is not perfect because the gift is to the wife's family of origin rather than to the couple themselves.
Nonetheless, a registering officer typically considers the gifts when deciding whether or not a marriage
has been "concluded in accordance with customary law." RCMA s. I. The registering officer is also
statutorily required to register the amount of the agreed-upon lobolo when she or he registers the
customary marriage. RCMA s. 4(4)(a). Customary marriage is discussed more extensively infra Parts
ll.C and IV.A.
43. See, e.g., Fourie/LGEP 156. The suspension of the ruling's application is made explicit in
parts l(c)(ii) and 2(d) of the Court's order in Fourie/LGEP. Even the choice to suspend the remedy
temporarily was influenced by symbolic concerns. Justice Sachs argued that the symbolic stability of
same-sex marriage would benefit from having weathered a political process. "[Marriage] represents a
major symbolical milestone in [the plaintiffs'] long walk to equality and dignity. The greater and more
secure the institutional imprimatur for their union, the more solidly will it and other such unions be
rescued from legal oblivion[.]" Id. 137. I discuss the outcome of this punt to the legislature at more
length below. Infra Part IV.B.
44. Id. 155.
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clearing it.45 In addition to giving Parliament one year to respond, the opinion
also promised to judge that response by two guiding principles, both
consolidationist: (1) Any "separate but equal" legal framework would bejudged • 46
judged very skeptically; and (2) the word "marriage" must be retained.
47
The "separate but equal" ideology has at least as ignominious a history in
South Africa as it does in the United States. Not content with "mere" education
and residential segregation, apartheid South Africa attempted to create
ostensibly autonomous countries for the sequestration of much of its black
population. 48 Justice Sachs surely had this example in mind when he invoked
the language, although he opted to reference a less inflammatory-if no less
painful-example, in which an earlier Court had upheld a black candidate
attorney's contempt of court conviction for sitting at the "European
practitioners" table .4
By contrast, Sachs asserted that the current Court would be very skeptical
of any "assert[ion] that the separation was neutral if the facilities provided by
the law were substantially the same for both groups." 50 Even if all provisions
were equal, Justice Sachs argued, it would still be possible that a segregated
dispensation would send a message destructive to the "dignity and sense of
self-worth of the persons affected., 51 Notably, any hypothetical separation
would have no actual spatial dimension; the real separation would inhere at the
more abstract level of statutory structure, perhaps accompanied by a distinction
in nomenclature (as described below). And so Justice Sachs's expansive
concern with almost purely symbolic harm appeared yet again.
If Parliament could violate the Constitution even when providing equal
"facilities," then surely the use of a different word would violate the Court's
standards.5 2 The Court seemed to emphasize as much with its insistence that the
word marriage be retained-an insistence that all but presumes its significance
for all couples.53 "Leveling down so as to deny access to civil marriage to all
45. The lone justice not to sign onto the entire Fourie/LGEP opinion, Kate O'Regan, recognized as
much, voting against the one-year suspension in her concurrence: "It is true that there is a choice for the
legislature to make, but on the reasoning of the majority judgment, there is not a wide range of options."
Id. T 168 (O'Regan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
46. Fourie/LGEP 77 150-52.
47. Id. 7 149 ("Leveling down so as to deny access to civil marriage to all would not promote the
achievement of the enjoyment of equality.").
48. See WILLIAM BEINART, TWENTIETH-CENTURY SOUTH AFRICA 217-27 (2001). The United
States has its own ongoing analogue, of course-the Native American reservation-although the
sovereignty of the latter is less all-encompassing than the architects of apartheid pretended for the
"Bantustan" homelands. See id.




52. As already mentioned and as discussed at more length below, infra Part IV.C, government's
initial slash-marriage proposal seemed destined to test the certainty of this hypothesis. With that
challenge now possibly averted, the final bill may yet test the limits of the Court's "separate-but-equal"
skepticism.
53. See Fourie/LGEP 149.
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would not promote the achievement of the enjoyment of equality. Such parity
of exclusion rather than of inclusion would distribute resentment evenly,
instead of dissipating it equally for all."54 Relying yet again on an
expansive conception of the role of government action in constructing
symbolic social inequality, Sachs entrenched into South African law not just a
freedom to marry, but also a constitutional mandate that government provide an
affirmative right to marriage.
B. Consolidation vs. Proliferation in Fourie/LGEP
Each of these guidelines reveals a fundamentally consolidationist view of
marriage. The Court's skepticism of separate arrangements would tend to
discourage the creation of new statuses, even if the real problem of "separate
but equal" ideologies is less the multiplication of statuses in itself than the
ascription of some South Africans to one of those statuses based on a
constitutionally impermissible characteristic. Its insistence on the value of the
word "marriage" effectively insists that the single status which will be retained
and expanded must be the single status already in existence: marriage. Only in
one brief but important passage does the Court seem to contemplate the
possibility that both of these guidelines could realistically be met through a
more proliferationist alternative.
In a private memo solicited by the Court during its Fourie/LGEP
deliberations, the South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC)
55
suggested the possibility of creating one marriage act available to couples
regardless of their gender makeup, and another marriage act restricted to
opposite-sex couples who wished not to be married under the same law as
same-sex couples.5 6 In the SALRC's proposal, the existing marriage act would
be the home of heterosexual objectors and be renamed the "Conventional
Marriages Act," while a new, gender-neutral "Reform Marriages Act" would be
created to accommodate the needs of same-sex couples and those heterosexual
couples who also chose to marry under the new law.
57
Although the Court declined to rule on this alternative's constitutionality, it
did mention it as one option Parliament might wish to consider. 58 It noted the
SALRC's contention that "the family law dispensation in South Africa would
54. Id.
55. The SALRC is an independent agency charged with a research and public consultation role in
the development of new legislation.
56. Minister of Home Affairs & Another v Fourie & Another 2006 (3) BCLR 355 (CC) 144 (S.
Aft.).
57. Id. This is essentially the final bill's approach, under a different nomenclature. An alternative
possibility, with slightly different symbolic implications, would amend the existing marriages act to
eliminate its gender requirements, and build the heterosexuals-only Conventional Marriages Act through
a wholly new statutory structure. This latter possibility was apparently advocated by some in the
SALRC after the Fourie/LGEPjudgment.
58. Id. 147.
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therefore make provision for a marriage act of general application together with
a number of additional, specific marriage acts for special interest groups such
as couples in customary marriages, Islamic marriages, Hindu marriages and
now also opposite-sex specific marriages. ' 59 While the primary virtue of this
option was apparently that it was sufficiently well-developed for Parliament to
consider quickly,60 its inclusion by the Court also represents a nod to the
proliferationist program of the elected branches, as well as an affirmation of
one of the values driving that program-that of expanding "choice."
61
Notably, however, this option would expand heterosexual autonomy at the
expense of homosexual freedom. Parliament has just passed a minor variation
62on this model, which may not pass constitutional muster. First, and most
abstractly, placing homosexuality on a plane of identity with traditional African
culture or Islamic religious commitments presents them as mutually exclusive
identity categories. Traditional African, Muslim, and Hindu gays and lesbians
63are preemptively erased. Second and more to the point, the existing
customary marriage framework and the proposed Islamic equivalent are also
opt-in laws, permitting a couple to choose under which identity, and which
corresponding body of law, they want to effect their recognition. In contrast,
because gays and lesbians under the SALRC proposal could only marry under a
same-sex marriage statute, they would not have the same choice.
64
C. Marriage is Sufficient-and Necessary
As with the SALRC proposal just discussed, choice was an important
frame for the Constitutional Court in Fourie/LGEP. The Court saw its task,
however, not as one of expanding choice as far as possible, but as one of
requiring the minimally acceptable alternatives necessary for constitutionally
sufficient choice. One of marriage's many virtues, in the Court's eyes, was that
it is a uniquely sufficient vehicle for the expression of such choice. This
sanguine, voluntaristic notion of marriage echoed the Court's holding and
reasoning in a domestic partnership case decided less than a year before
Fourie/LGEP. In the 2004 case of Volks v Robinson, a middle-class white
woman asked for maintenance benefits from the estate of her deceased male
domestic partner, on grounds that denying her these benefits violated. the
59. See id. 146.
60. Id. 147.
61. Id. 146.
62. See Civil Union Bill (amended), supra note 15, s. 4.
63. None of the options on the table in the Fourie/LGEP litigation or the ensuing legislative debate
would solve this problem, as only civil marriage was challenged. An enterprising gay or lesbian
traditional or Muslim couple could pose this question through litigation. The legal and, especially,
political questions of gender-neutral customary and Islamic marriage are extremely difficult and
interesting in their own right, and deserve their own full paper.
64. 1 discuss other problems with this "heterosexual objector" proposal in Part IV, where I consider
the various options before government and Parliament.
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Constitution's prohibition of discrimination on the basis of marital status.65 She
lost.66
Although the Court agreed with plaintiff Ethel Robinson that the denial of
automatic maintenance payments to domestic partners did constitute
discrimination on the basis of marital status, they found this discrimination to
be constitutionally justifiable.6 7 Advancing a voluntaristic contract theory of
marriage, the Court held that "[the plaintiffs] relationship with [her partner] is
one in which each was free to continue or not, and from which each was free to
withdraw at will, without obligation and without legal or other formalities."
68
The fatal fact for Robinson was the absence of any "legal impediment" to her
and her partner choosing to marry.69 Given this fact, it could only be presumed
that their failure to marry was freely chosen, and that her partner did not wish
maintenance benefits to be paid out to her from his estate. 70 The Court
explained, "The decision to enter into a marriage relationship and to sustain
such a relationship signifies a willingness to accept the moral and legal
obligations, in particular, the reciprocal duty of support placed upon spouses
and other invariable consequences of a marriage relationship.' With what
seemed to the Court to be a clearly expressed wish to the contrary, and no
statutory mandate requiring such a payout, the Court was powerless to help the
surviving partner. Where Fourie/LGEP invited gays and lesbians to marry,
Robinson all but required it of heterosexual couples seeking legal protection.
These cases, taken together, sketch the outlines of the Court's consolidationist
agenda.
III. THE ABOLITIONIST VIEW OF MARRIAGE
From the point of view of many gays and lesbians, however, such naive
celebration of marital choice fails to realize the full implications of a deeply
and broadly symbolic conception of legal discrimination. In this view, status
symbols such as marriage are status symbols only because they discriminate.
The choice, even when it is a choice, is ethically loaded. Michael Warner's
polemical yet subtle work, The Trouble with Normal, 72 offers one of the most
sophisticated articulations of this position. He writes, "To a couple that gets
married, marriage just looks ennobling .... Stand outside it for a second and
you see the implication: If you do not have it, you and your relations are less
65. Volks NO v Robinson & Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC) (S. Afr.).




70. His will left her a portion of his estate, but no maintenance benefits. Id. 7.
71. Id. 91.
72. MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS OF QUEER
LIFE (1999).
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worthy. Without this corollary effect, marriage would not be able to endow
anybody's life with significance."
73
In a single footnote, the Fourie/LGEP Court acknowledged LGBT
concerns, documented in the SALRC research process, that marriage is "an
oppressive institution that is wrongly presented by a heterosexual society as the
norm against which all other relationships should be measured., 74 The Court
further cited, with apparent approval, the SALRC's suggestion that "the
legislature should respect the autonomy of these partners and make provision
for both these groups. 75 This suggestion, however, failed to grapple with the
objection's full implications. Would "providing" for the "autonomy" of those
who wish not to marry really lessen the degree to which the non-marital choice
is measured against the marital norm? In other words, despite its
groundbreaking concern with symbolic equality and the role it assigned the law
in helping to construct those symbolic systems, the Court's ambition remained
limited to those who wish to marry. While the Court did leave room for further
legal reform regarding those who cannot marry, such as rural women who
cannot convince their more powerful and resourced male partners to formalize
76their relationships, those who view marriage as an inherently problematic
institution were dismissed-as the consolidationist project demanded.
Like the South African Constitutional Court, many gay marriage advocates
speak a voluntaristic language of the right to choose recognition. Abolitionists
such as Warner, however, spurn this formulation for its decontextualized vision
of choice, a vision that in Warner's view neglects "the very privileged relation
to legitimacy that makes people desire [marriage] in the first place. 77 In this
view, marriage is not just a choice. It is also a command-a command
disguised as a reward so enticing that one must wonder about the rationality-
or, its synonym in this context, the morality-of anyone who would not seek it
out. In other words, marriage not only recognizes; it also regulates. By
constructing marriage as the normative center of human life, and everything
else as either prelude to or denouement from that sanctified state, the regulatory
pressure to get and stay married domesticates not just non-normative sexuality,
but also non-romantic relationship behavior of all sorts.
Warner's interpretation of law's influence resembles that of the
Fourie/LGEP Court in its expansiveness, even as it casts this influence in a
more pessimistic light. Whereas Justice Sachs sees law's tendrils of influence
in its capacity for recognition, Warner situates a similarly omnipresent
influence in law's capacity for regulation. In Warner's critique of same-sex
marriage advocates' rhetoric of decontextualized choice, he mocks their focus
on law as a recognition tool. He highlights a point I raised above: Law is not
73. Id. at 82.
74. Fourie/LGEP 129 n.123.
75. See id.
76. Id. 160. For more on this topic, see infra Part IV.
77. WARNER, supra note 72, at 96.
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necessary to make a public statement. Warner explains, "You can make a
public statement with any kind of ceremony, or by talking to people, or by
circulating a queer zine. A legal marriage, on the other hand, might well be
private or even secret." 78 Choosing marriage for the public statement it sends
denies the intrinsic statement also sent about those who cannot or do not make
the same choice.
For Warner, the implication of this observation is that the role of the law
predominantly lies elsewhere. He argues, "The purpose of legal marriage is
[not] 'to make a public statement,' 79 but to regulate sexuality and exclude the
abject. The symbolic power of law does not only operate to confer respect, but
also to withhold respect from others. It is not, as same-sex marriage advocates
seem to suggest, just a wedding guest. It is both a guest and a bouncer.
Recognition and regulation are not just intrinsically linked; they are the same
process.
If this is true, the logical conclusion is that marriage should be abolished. If
marriage's meaning is only possible through the exclusion of those
insufficiently moral or attractive to seek or win its protection, then why should
marriage confer meaning at all? It is a fundamentally damning critique. But
would abolition of legal marriage really solve the problem? While Warner
raises an excellent point-that we need not elevate romantic relationships over
all others and that legal marriage plays some role in this elevation---one must
also remember that the law is not solely responsible for upholding this
normative hierarchy. Indeed, Warner himself correctly points out that law does
not always hold this power, and that, in radically different historical situations,
the value of a relationship has sometimes actually been seen as inhering in
law's non-recognition of, or even hostility toward, the relationship. 80 This
important observation points out that the symbolic influence of the law works
its magic as its intersects with any number of other normative cultural codes-
as it weaves its way through what Sachs might call its "context" of application.
In tying marriage's "legal force" to its "cultural normativity," Warner
implicitly acknowledges the tight link between the two.8 1 Meanwhile, in
agreeing with theorist Gayle Rubin that the "distinctions between good sex and
bad do not necessarily come as whole packages," 82 Warner implicitly assumes
that some other force-be it random social action or an intervening normative
system-has the potential to disrupt this link's one-to-one correspondence. This
assumption appears all the more true when one takes note of practices such as
adultery, still marked by social stigma even if no longer legally regulated.
78. Id. at 98. It should be pointed out here that secret marriage ceremonies are currently not
permitted under South African law, which requires that they be held in a public place or, at a minimum,
with open doors. Marriage Act 25 of 1961, s. 29(2).
79. WARNER, supra note 72, at 98.
80. Id. at 101-04.
81. Id. at 107.
82. Id. at 26 (citing Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of
Sexuality, in PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY (Carol S. Vance ed., 1984)).
2006]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
Warner's critique is inconsistent because he acknowledges this complex
interplay as he constructs his critique, but he disavows it as he transforms that
critique into a normative recommendation for the abolition of marriage. If we
abolish legal marriage, what next? Can we not expect people to turn to other
sources of power-say, the church-to elevate the romantic relationships they
may continue to value more than others? Or, in the event that we replace legal
marriage with a different scheme for protecting relationships, conjugal and
otherwise, how can we be sure that this alternative will not simply come to be
another marital synonym? Indeed, is it not possible that merely replacing
"marriage" with "relationship contracts" or "domestic partnerships" would
actually encourage people to imagine these alternatives as replacements for
marriage? If we want to expand the imaginative vocabulary through which we
recognize and protect relationships in all their forms, perhaps it makes sense to
strategically retain marriage as part of a broadly proliferating menu of
relationship recognition options. The first, tentative indications of such a
possibility make up the other half of the South African story, located in that
government's elected branches.
IV. A PROLIFERATIONIST APPROACH TO RELATIONSHIP RECOGNITION
In the South African context, the need for expanded relationship protection
is not abstract. Most immediately, almost 2.5 million South Africans report
themselves to be living in non-marital cohabiting relationships. 83 Though not
legally registered or recognized, there is no formal, legal reason that the
partners in these "marriage-like" relationships could not marry. Particularly
common in under-resourced communities of color, the "choice" not to marry
has been linked by research to gendered power differentials. 84 Many South
African men resist marrying, perhaps in part because there is little incentive for
men to entangle themselves in marriage's web of legal obligations.85 Many
South African women who wish to marry ultimately acquiesce to unmarried
relationships with such men, due to power imbalances with, direct economic
83. STATISTICS SOUTH AFRICA, REPORT No. 03-02-04, CENSUS 2001: PRIMARY TABLES SOUTH
AFRICA, CENSUS 1996 AND 2001 COMPARED 31 (2001), available at http://www.statssa.gov.za/
censusOl/html/RSAPrimary.pdf. This represents almost eight percent of South Africa's population over
the age of fifteen. Id. See also Written Submissions on Behalf of the Amicus Curiae at 6, Volks NO v
Robinson & Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC) (S. Aft.), archived at
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/. Not a small proportion of these relationships are de facto
polygynous relationships (i.e., relationships involving one male and multiple female partners).
Particularly because of migrant labor, many men have a partner in their rural home and another in their
urban home, with or without being married to one of them. Id. at 10-11 (quoting CENTRE FOR APPLIED
LEGAL STUDIES/GENDER RESEARCH PROJECT, COHABITATION & GENDER IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN
CONTEXT 1.4.1 (2001)).
84. Written Submissions on Behalf of the Amicus Curiae, supra note 83, at 11-15 (citations
omitted).
85. Id. at 15.
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dependence on, and the threat of violence from their partners. 86 Countless
women are thus left at the mercy of their male partners' whims and good
health, with no legal recognition of their relationship and no accordant rights of
protection should the relationship end.
The first well-intentioned policy extension implemented to help such
women was the reform and revival of customary marriage. The Recognition of
Customary Marriages Act (RCMA), passed in 1998, allows South Africans to
consecrate their marriages under either the civil or customary law at their
choosing. 87 This legislation increased access to legal protection for many of the
women just described, especially in rural areas, by rendering traditional African
weddings legally binding-even those which occurred prior to the statute's
adoption.88 It still required, nonetheless, consent from the would-be husband.89
It also left the door open to a future polygynous marriage by that husband, 90
requiring only that the first wife be consulted regarding the ensuing property
arrangements. 9 1 Moreover, many women in such cohabiting relationships do
not define themselves in terms of African tradition and would almost certainly
consider marriage under such a law to be inappropriate. By itself, therefore,
customary marriage would be insufficient to help all women in these
circumstances.
Parliament's response to Fourie/LGEP had the potential to further address
this situation. The first proposed Civil Union Bill 92 included provisions for both
registered93 and de facto domestic partnerships.9 4 These provisions drew on the
SALRC investigation process that was already well underway, a process whose
86. Id. at 14-15.
87. Recognition of Customary Marriages Act (RCMA) 120 of 1998. The law provides, inter alia,
that:
" One may not be married under civil and customary law simultaneously [s. 10(4)];
" Customary marriages are legal marriages for all intents and purposes [s. 2], which raises
them to equal legal status with civil marriages;
" Women in customary marriages are full legal persons with equal status to their husbands
before the law [s. 6];
* Both parties must consent to be married under customary law [s. 3(l)(a)(ii)];
" Should the husband wish to enter an additional customary marriage, his current spouse(s)
must participate in the hearing determining property arrangements going forward [s. 7(4)(b)
& s. 7(8)];
* Married partners may move their marriage from customary law to civil law provided they are
not married to anyone else under customary law [s. 10(1)];
" Married partners may pursue divorce; such proceedings are limited to the civil courts [s.
8(1)].
88. RCMA ss. 2(l)-(2). Ordinarily legal force depends on the marriage's registration by an
authorized registering officer, although lack of such registration does not in itself invalidate the
marriage. See RCMA s. 4(9).
89. RCMA ss. 3(l)(a)(ii).
90. See RCMA ss. 2(3)-(4). The term "polygynous" refers to a marriage involving one husband and
multiple wives.
91. RCMA s. 7(8).
92. Civil Union Bill (original), supra note 15.
93. Id. at ch. 3, pt. 1 (2006).
94. Civil Union Bill (original) at ch. 3, pt. 1I. Both forms of domestic partnership have been
removed from the final bill. See Civil Union Bill (amended), supra note 15.
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ultimate recommendations deftly balanced the very difficult conflict between
concerns about protecting vulnerable partners, on the one hand, and
relationship autonomy, on the other.
A. Proposed Domestic Partnership Policy Reforms
The SALRC's discussion paper put forth two possible domestic partnership
regimes: one requiring registration,
95 and the other for de facto partnerships.
96
Generally speaking, the legal entanglements suggested for registered
partnerships were more extensive than those proposed for de facto partnerships,
with the property arrangements of the latter to be adjudicated by courts
according to principles of equity.97 The SALRC suggested that, because of this
divergence in approach, it may be possible, even advisable, to adopt both
regimes. 98 It would of course also be possible to choose just one or the other-
or, of course, none. As mentioned above, 99 the Civil Union Bill submitted to
Parliament included both frameworks and broadly resembled the SALRC
proposal. The final bill has removed all domestic partnerships.'
00
The rights and obligations attending registered domestic partnerships in the
SALRC proposal were built on a "blank-slate plus" framework. 10 1 Rather than
beginning with the basic legal template of marriage and excluding particular
rights and obligations, this framework starts from zero and selects those rights
and obligations deemed appropriate. 102 The SALRC proposed various legal
consequences, including:
* A means-tested duty of support;
* Enforceable joint liability for household expenses;
* Joint liability to third-party creditors; and
* "Accrual" as the default property arrangement.
10 3
The first three of these also apply to marriages; the last is in effect a limited
version of community-of-property, which is the default property arrangement
95. SA Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 104 Domestic Partnerships (ch. 9) (2003) 266-
89, available at http://www.doj.gov.za/salrc/dpapers.htm (cited URL contains links to paper in several
chapters).
96. Id. at 302-18. The SALRC also proposed an ex post facto relationship option, substantially
similar to the de facto partnership option except that it could only be ascribed after the relationship's
dissolution following a petition by one or both parties. Id. at 318-29. In practice, it seems unlikely that
de facto relationships would become legally cognizable until some sort of dispute arose, either between
the partners themselves or between one or both partners and a third party. In other words, broadly
speaking, the ex post facto option could be viewed as a limited version of the de facto option.
97. Id. at 294.
98. Id. at 334.
99. Supra notes 16, 93-94.
100. See Civil Union Bill (amended), supra note 15.
101. Id. at 266.
102. Id. at 265.
103. Id. at 274-75. Roughly speaking, while "community-of-property" effectively gives each
spouse or partner claim to half the combined estate as a whole, "accrual" limits the shared portion to the
change in value after the marriage or partnership commences. See D.S.P. CRONJt & JACQUELINE
HEATON, SOUTH AFRICAN FAMILY LAW 97-106 (2d ed. 2004).
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for marriages. 10 4 In addition to this difference, the plan does not provide for
several legal consequences of marriage, including immigration and parental
rights.
Despite its decision to build the material framework of registered domestic
partnerships upwards from a blank slate, the SALRC curiously listed the
possible reasons that couples might choose this option over that of marriage as
"religious, political or philosophical."'10 5 This focus on intangible motivations
suggests that their primary vision for the new status was precisely that-a new
status in the symbolic sense. The expansion of relationship recognition would
be achieved, in this view, through the proliferation of status distinctions.
Notably, the SALRC did not order these symbolic distinctions hierarchically.
The implicit assumption was a liberal one of ethical impartiality: Some people
value marriage more and some people value domestic partnership more, and the
state's role is simply to make all the alternatives available. Whether this
ostensible value neutrality would translate into a similar, ethically impartial
normative framework amongst South African society at large, were such a
proposal to be adopted, is a complicated and, at this stage, unpredictable
empirical question. It represents, nonetheless, an intriguing alternative to the
marriage abolitionist position.
The SALRC proposal for de facto partnerships complicated the question of
status even further through its post hoc ascription of the status to partners who
may never have chosen such a self-definition, or even have been aware that
they might be defined as such. The exclusive power to determine the existence
and contours of a de facto partnership would lie with the court.' 0 6 While this
would certainly compromise the autonomy of the relationship's members, the
SALRC believed such a step necessary in order to protect those many women
who are relatively powerless to secure formal, legal agreements from their
partners.0 7 This crucial policy goal does little, however, to explain the
SALRC's choice to advance de facto partnerships as the only option available
to non-conjugal relationships. 10 8 In the SALRC view, "[T]he remedies
available under contract law and other legislation, together with the fact that
they are included in the unregistered relationships proposal, provide adequate
protection for partners in such [non-conjugal] relationships. ' 09 With this
language the SALRC distinguished the prosaic protection needs of non-
104. See CRONJt & HEATON, supra note 103, at 69. Some scholars also refer to it "as a type of
postponed community of profit" system. Id. at 98. Notably, accrual is currently the default option for
those South Africans who choose not to marry in community of property. See id. at 97. From this point
of view, one could understand the registered domestic partnership proposal as a kind of customary
"opposite" of the default marital property regime.
105. SA Law Reform Commission, supra note 95, at 269.
106. Id. at 302-04.
107. Id. at 290.
108. See id. at 269 (limiting the registered partnership proposal to conjugal couples).
109. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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conjugal relationships from the full entry into moral society sought by conjugal
relationships.
Perhaps that would be true for many such non-conjugal relationships. It is
difficult at this point to imagine a mother and her adult daughter seeking a
public ceremony to affirm their financial interdependence. But other possible
categories of non-conjugal relationships are less of a stretch. What about long-
term, intimately cohabiting friends, for example? Not coincidentally, this last
model of relationship is particularly common in the LGBT community.
Imagine how much more stable such relationships could be and how much
more central they could become to the creation of individual and community
identities if they were granted recognition through a ceremony or, to invoke
Justice Sachs's words, "recognised by law."
And this, again, is where we should push Justice Sachs's expansive vision
of law-in-society to the critical edge invoked by Warner. If law constitutes,
perhaps it also generates. Thus, the availability of a legally recognized
ceremony might lead to conditions under which a mother and her adult
daughter would begin to contemplate the possibility of formalizing their
relationship with some sort of ceremony. If we are interested in mitigating the
hierarchies of status by which we romanticize some relationships while we lack
the vocabulary with which to recognize others, perhaps we should give them
that option. One small change in the SALRC's proposal would have made that
possible: opening up registered domestic partnerships to non-conjugal
couples.I10 With a little bit of reimagination, such a reform could be seen as an
extension of the steadfast expansion of relationship recognition that South
Africa has been advancing in recent years, until now under the exclusive
banner of marriage. Unfortunately, the bill eventually put before Parliament did
not even go as far as the SALRC. Under this bill, even de facto partnerships
would be limited only to conjugal relationships."'1
B. How Might Parliament Have Met the Challenge of Fourie/LGEP?
Despite these shortcomings, the inclusion of domestic partnerships in
government's first response to the Fourie/LGEP ruling was a welcome
surprise-and its eventual removal an unwelcome one. Particularly in the wake
of the consolidationist Robinson ruling, there was an even greater need for
some sort of protection to be extended to unmarried partners. That the elected
branches almost accepted this challenge in the absence of a court order
highlights their broadly proliferationist agenda with respect to relationship
110. A few consequential provisions would also require amendment, namely the prohibitions on
consanguinity. See SA Law Reform Commission, supra note 95, at 270. This could open its own set of
"problems," however, insofar as one believes that incestuous conjugal relationships should be
prohibited. I leave that loaded issue aside in this Comment.
111. See Civil Union Bill (original), supra note 15, s. l(e) (defining "unregistered domestic
partnership").
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recognition. This agenda was equally important in influencing their response to
the Fourie/LGEP ruling's central mandate: marriage for same-sex couples.
In August of this year, the deliberation over government's response to the
Fourie/LGEP ruling finally came out from behind the closed doors of intra-
Cabinet squabbles. From the record that is now emerging, it appears that there
had been three options on the table, each with varying chances of surviving
constitutional scrutiny. First, Parliament could have simply enacted the remedy
ordered by the Court: gender-neutral marriage, a proposal that was advanced in
a bill leaked by the Department of Home Affairs. 1' 2 Second, as already
discussed briefly in Part II, in addition to neutralizing marriage's gender
requirements, they could have created a new marriage status for those
heterosexuals who object to solemnizing their marriage under the same law that
recognizes same-sex couples. Finally, they could provide civil unions or
another status with all the material benefits of marriage save the word itself.
1. Gender-Neutral Marriage
The first and most obvious option was that sought by the LGEP and, in the
event of Parliament inaction within a year of judgment, granted by the
Constitutional Court in Fourie/LGEP. This proposal would render the marriage
formula of the Marriage Act of 1961 gender-neutral. This marriage formula is
the default oath with which authorized marriage officers solemnize common-
law marriages in the country, and it reads:
Do you, A.B., declare that as far as you know there is no lawful
impediment to your proposed marriage with C.D. here present, and
that you call all here present to witness that you take C.D. as your
lawful wife (or husband)?"'
Underlying this oath is a common-law marriage prescription, limiting marriage
to "the legally recognised voluntary union for life in common of one man and
one woman, to the exclusion of all others while it lasts."' 14 Echoing an earlier,
112. Marriage Act Amendment Bill, 2006. The bill was never formally released. It quietly appeared
on the website of the Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG) on August 1, 2006, the same date that the
Department of Home Affairs first briefed the Portfolio Committees on Justice and Constitutional
Development and on Home Affairs regarding the Fourie/LGEP decision. At least one Home Affairs
official expressed surprise to me that it had been made public, and it has since been pulled from the
PMG website. It was nonetheless a focus of LGBT and human-rights sector advocacy efforts around this
issue for much of the month of August 2006. See, e.g., Stephanie Saville, Rights Groups Want Bill to
Legalise Same-Sex Marriage, THE MERCURY, Aug. 14, 2006, at 4; Slindokuhle Bhengu, Balwela
Ilungelo Lokushada [They Fight for the Right to Marry], ISOLEZWE, Aug. 16, 2006, at 13. The leaked
bill is on file with the author.
113. Marriage Act 25 of 1961 s. 30(1).
114. 1 JUNE D. SINCLAIR (ASSISTED BY JACQUELINE HEATON), THE LAW OF MARRIAGE 305
(1996); see also Seedat's Executors v The Master 1917 A.D. 302 (Natal) at 309 (S. Aft.); Hyde v Hyde
& Woodmansee, (1866) 1 L.R.P. & D. 130, 133. The proceedings of Fourie/LLGEP revealed some
disagreement in the judiciary about the relative priority of the statutory oath and the common-law
definition. For example, Justice Cameron argued for the Supreme Court of Appeals majority in the
Fourie matter that common-law reform would not automatically trigger corresponding reform in the
statutory oath, while Justice Farlam argued in his concurrence for the same court that the statutory oath
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very similar proposal by the SALRC, the LGEP petitioned for and received
(subject to the one-year suspension) a remedy that would simply add the word
"spouse" after the words "wife (or husband)" in section 30(1) of the Marriage
Act.
115
2. A New Statute for Heterosexual Objectors
As already mentioned, a second option was floated by the SALRC in a
private memo to the Court during the Fourie/LGEP deliberations. Under this
option, one gender-neutral marriage statute would be created, accompanied by
an additional statute under which opponents to same-sex marriage would be
permitted to choose a "conventional" marriage. The template for this option
was customary marriage, a provenance that reveals the influence of the
proliferationist approach. It was thought that conventional marriage would
allow heterosexual objectors to register their own cultural commitments, just as
traditional Africans do through the customary marriage statute. However, in my
judgment the analogy is faulty. Most significantly, customary law is an actual
body of law, backed in the final instance by the coercive power of the state. As
such, it is subject to both constitutional support and constitutional restrictions
of an entirely different order from those attending, for example, religious
beliefs. 116 Furthermore, customary law is both substantively and
methodologically distinct from the civil law that otherwise governs South
Africa, and therefore requires some sort of meta-law integrating it with South
African civil law.
1 17
Less tangibly, but perhaps more importantly, registering one's marriage as
a conventional marriage would do far more than merely affirm one's own felt
merely describes the common-law definitions that were current at the time of the statute's enactment,
and that the oath was thus subject to judicial reform to the extent necessary for proper reflection of any
common-law reform the court might adopt. Compare Fourie & Another v Minister of Home Affairs &
Others 2005 (3) BCLR 241 (SCA) 27 (S. Afr.) (Cameron, JA writing for the majority), with id. M
133-38 (Farlam, JA, concurring in the judgment). In yet another view, the SALRC proposal seems to
suggest that legislative amendment of the oath would by itself have the effect of changing the common
law, as it nowhere mentions the need for common-law reform. In any event, these questions became
moot when Fourie's case challenging the common law was consolidated with the Equality Project's case
against the statute. See Minister of Home Affairs & Others v Fourie & Another 2006 (3) BCLR 355
(CC) 33-36 (S. Afr.); see also supra note 6.
115. The original SALRC proposal was to substitute "spouse" for "wife (or husband),; rather than
to add it.
116. The status of customary law as law is constitutionally enshrined. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 12,
s. 211-12. On the other hand, it is explicitly subordinated to the Bill of Rights. Id. ch. 2, s. 39(3).
117. The RCMA forms but one part of this larger program, known as "harmonisation." SA Law
Commission Issue Paper 3 Harmonisation of the Common Law and the Indigenous Law (Customary
Marriages) (1996), available at http://www.doj.gov.za/salrc/ipapers/ip03prj90l1997.pdf. Other
harmonisation legal reforms include the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework
Amendment Act 41 of 2003, available at http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/2003/a41-03.pdf
(regulating the recognition of traditional communities and traditional leaders); and Bhe & Others v
Magistrate, Khayelitsha & Others 2005 (1) BCLR I (CC) (S. Aft.), archived at
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/ (overturning the customary legal practice of primogeniture under
the Constitutional Court's authority to reform customary law).
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cultural beliefs, as is ostensibly the case with customary marriage. It
necessarily implies a disapproval of someone else's cultural beliefs-namely,
the belief that lesbian and gay couples are entitled to civic recognition through
marriage. One could question the sharpness of this distinction: To choose an
identity is always, of course, to define oneself against what one imagines lies
beyond that identity's borders. As already argued, however, distinctions need
not necessarily be hierarchical. Whatever symbolic politics may be involved in
choosing customary marriage, to choose so-called "conventional" marriage
quite clearly sends an intentional message, not only of distinction, but also of
disapproval. Furthermore, it does so with resources specifically provided by
the State for that purpose. This dimension of a conventional marriages proposal
is only underlined by the fact that the existing Marriage Act already has an
escape valve by which religious institutions can submit their own marriage
formulas for approval.18 Ample space already exists in the Marriage Act for
South Africans to solemnize a marriage that affirms their own religious beliefs.
There is no need for the law to ingest those beliefs into itself or to select out
one aspect of those beliefs-disapproval of same-sex marriages-for special
treatment. 
11 9
3. Civil Unions, Slash Marriages, and other Gay-Specific Options
The original SALRC discussion paper on domestic partnerships proposed
one final option: civil unions. In the SALRC's formulation, civil unions would
carry all the same rights and responsibilities as marriages. With some
modifications that may mitigate its constitutional problems, the Cabinet
eventually proposed this option. 12  The proposal retained the civil union
language but defined civil unions to include both same-sex, marriage-like "civil
partnerships," as well as "domestic partnerships" which, as already discussed,
would be available to conjugal couples regardless of gender makeup.
12 1
Confusingly, but encouragingly, same-sex partners to a civil partnership would
have the option to refer to their union as a "marriage" during their official
ceremony. 22 Otherwise, however, the statute refers to the union as a marriage
118. Marriage Act 25 of 1961 s. 30.
119. Yet another proposal that could be adopted alongside any of these options would separate civil
and religious marriage completely, by authorizing only officers of the State to perform legally binding
marriages. The SALRC discussion paper floated such a proposal, but it has since apparently been
abandoned. Indeed, the Civil Union Bill, in both its original and amended forms, permits state marriage
officials to refuse to perform civil unions on grounds of conscience.
120. The final, amended bill more closely resembles the heterosexual objectors option discussed
supra Part IV.B.2.
121. Civil Union Bill (original), supra note 15. LGBT advocates pointed out that this associated
civil partnerships with a status lower than marriage, that of domestic partnership. OUT LGBT Well-
being, Parliamentary Submission: Civil Union Bill, at 8-9 (Sept. 29, 2006), available at
http://www.pmg.org.za/docs/2006/061017out.pdf. The final bill defines "civil unions" to encompass
both "marriages" and "civil partnerships." Civil Union Bill (amended), supra note 15, s. 1.
122. Civil Union Bill (original), s. 11(1).
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in only one location, a provision that defines "marriage" in all other laws to
encompass civil partnerships performed under the proposed bill.123 This latter
provision is probably better understood as a practical "bridging" provision
designed to efficiently and tightly ensure that civil partnerships and marriages
carry the same tangible benefits, rather than as an attempt to close the symbolic
distinction between marriage and civil partnership. 124 After all, if the Cabinet
wished to close the symbolic gap, why would they use different terms at all?
However one interprets the bridging provision, it is difficult to say with
certainty whether the original Civil Union Bill would have provided for same-
sex marriage or not. If it were passed and eventually challenged in Court, it
would have been evaluated in terms of the messages it helped to construct
about same-sex unions. In the original proposal that message appeared to be
something like, "Call yourself married if you want, but don't expect us to do
so." A cynic might suggest that this is precisely the symbolic tightrope
government intended to walk: marriage enough to satisfy the Court, yet far
enough from marriage to placate anti-gay critics.
V. CONCLUSION
The slash marriage proposal-both in its original and, less so, in its
amended form-remains insulting. Both the original and the amended bills
limit LGBT people to the slash marriage option, a limitation that would be no
limitation at all were heterosexuals not given the additional option to choose
slash-free marriage under the conventional statute. This asymmetry was but one
reason that the status of slash-marriage was questionable at best in the original
proposal. The amended bill clarifies that the slash marriage originally afforded
to-or, if you prefer, forced upon-lesbian and gay South Africans will be
extended to heterosexuals as well. It further seems to clarify that the slash
marriage is indeed a marriage in the eyes of the state. Such developments fit
within the broader proliferationist project surrounding the Civil Union Bill. In
the foreseeable future, South Africans in conjugal relationships could choose to
affirm their relationships as civil marriages, customary marriages, Islamic
marriages, Hindu marriages, civil partnerships, or registered domestic
partnerships. The choice to marry, or to register, will probably remain morally
preferable in the eyes of most, as abolitionists like Warner might worry. The
proliferation of relationship statuses would not thoroughly shatter marriage's
normative power. But, perhaps by multiplying the dimensions and scope of
123. Civil Union Bill (original), s. 13(2). The new bill contains more references to marriage, most
notably in the section regarding religious officers. Civil Union Bill (amended), s. 5, supra note 15.
124. In the course of my advocacy work with OUT LGBT Well-being, it was suggested by a
colleague that this bridging provision could ironically open up full civil marriage under the Marriage
Act 25 of 1961 to same-sex couples, as the bridge could be interpreted to redefine the common-law
definition of "marriage" to encompass civil partnerships, and the common-law definition of marriage is
precisely what underlies the Marriage Act.
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choice available, that normative power would not remain so thoroughly
concentrated in the status of marriage alone-and the marriage status that
remains would itself take many different forms. No longer would the choice not
to marry be balanced against its monolithic opposite-the choice to marry.
Instead it would be one option among many on the menu.
Consolidationist same-sex marriage advocates and marriage abolitionists
seem to have become locked in an ever more intractable, yet ever more
irrelevant debate as same-sex marriage evolves into the seemingly inevitable
civil rights issue of our time. 125 Abolitionists have a powerful point, to be
sure-a point whose very power is both underscored and undercut by their
difficulty in getting the point heard. Most people do ask too much of marriage.
And most people do expect other people to get married. However, precisely
because this is so true, it would be naive to expect such sentiment to be easily
surrendered.
Abolition, I have come to suspect, might be a band-aid. Like many
abolitionists, I think other relationships, beyond simply the romantic and the
conjugal, deserve honor and support. I also think that marriage must recede in
symbolic importance if such alternative honor and support are to be fostered. I
have come to doubt, however, that the surest path to deemphasizing marriage
lies in abolition. I have come to wonder if, instead, it may lie in proliferation.
For its own unique demographic, economic, cultural, and political reasons,
South Africa has been multiplying the categories through which it recognizes
relationships for almost a decade, starting long before it confronted the question
of same-sex marriage per se. This history has helped to legitimize unique, if
somewhat problematic, responses to the same-sex marriage question. The
heterosexual objector "conventional marriage" was the first such proposal to be
seriously considered. In its place the Cabinet first proposed an alternative that
bore more marks of homophobic accommodation than proliferationist reform.
The slash marriage would have permitted same-sex couples to call themselves
married, even as it dangled government's ambivalence about the same term in
front of them. In so doing, however, the slash marriage would also have granted
same-sex couples a measure of self-definitional autonomy that not only
converges with proliferationism's underlying logic, but that could also help
render marriage more of a true choice for everyone. A gender-neutral slash
marriage, particularly in the context of an ever-proliferating menu of marriage
and partnership options, might just help all South Africans truly choose
marriage for their own reasons. With the National Assembly's adoption of just
such a reform in its final bill, the opportunity is imminent for us to test the
integrity of this unexpected promise.
125. To clarify: while I do see relationship recognition as a civil-rights issue, I do not see same-sex
marriage either as inevitable or as the most important civil-rights issue of our time. I do not even see it
as the most important civil-rights issue facing LGBT people, but that is a subject for another time. The
genuine belief of many in its inevitability and importance, however, is a crucial piece of data with which
I think abolitionists have not yet thoroughly grappled.
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